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Right to Privacy?: Why the Private Facts Tort Cannot
Coexist with the First Amendment.
David C. Adkins*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the May 2003 case of Johnson v. Max,' Katy Johnson
sued Tucker Max for invasion of privacy in Florida state court.
While most in the legal community might be unfamiliar with Katy
Johnson,3 beauty queen and moral crusader, and Tucker Max4 , culticon, knowledge of their identities is not critical to appreciate the
legal significance of their relationship. Rather, it is the short legal
battle between the two that is of primary concern to constitutional
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
1. Johnson v. Max, No. 2003CA004867AF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach
County filed May 2, 2003). Johnson was later removed to federal court. No.
03-Civ-80515-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. filed May 17, 2003). The case was
voluntarily dismissed on July 18, 2003. See Delray Woman Drops Suit over
Alleged Lies on Web, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 22, 2003, at 4B.
2. See Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction with Supporting
Memorandum of Law at 9, Johnson (No. 2003CA004867AF) (explaining that
"[a] cause of action exists under Florida law for common-law tort of invasion
of privacy") (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
3. Katy Johnson is a two-time winner of the Miss Vermont and Miss
Vermont USA pageants, respectively. See Affidavit of Plaintiff Katy Johnson
at 1, Johnson (No. 2003CA004867AF) [hereinafter Affidavit] (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review). Currently she uses her own name, likeness,
and image in a number of business and public interest ventures. Id. She is the
creator of a series of cartoons targeted at pre-teen and teenaged girls that are
intended to promote virtue and values. Id. at 3. She also maintains a website,
katyjohnson.com, incorporating her name. See Katy Johnson, Starlettes, at
http://www.katyjohnson.com (last modified Dec. 1, 2003).
4. Tucker Max, a graduate of Duke Law School, maintains his own
website, http://www.tuckermax.com, titled The Tucker Max Date Application
Page. He is also thq author of two books, The Definitive Book of Pick-up
Lines and Belligerence and Debauchery: The Tucker Max Stories, which
chronicle his personal life in intimate detail. See Affidavit, supra note 3, at 2.
Max has also been featured on the MTV program Sex2k. Id.
*
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observers.
In her complaint, Johnson alleged that Max tortiously
invaded her privacy by publicizing private facts about her on his
website regarding an alleged two-month relationship between the
two. Max's posted account painted Johnson in an unflattering
light, referring to her as "schizophrenic about sex," '6 and "the
stupidest female [he] had ever come across."7 As a result, during
the preliminary stages of the suit Johnson requested, and was
granted, an emergency motion for a temporary injunction,
enjoining Max from
[m]aking any use of [Johnson's] name, portrait,
photograph or other likeness.., without
limitation, to any use or inclusion by [Max] of,
or reference to, the name 'Katy Johnson,'
'Katy,' 'Johnson' or title 'Miss Vermont,' in any
periodicals or books, and on [Max's]
website ... or any other website, owned,
maintained or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by [Max]. s
Word of Johnson's suit and the resulting prior restraint on
Max's speech was reported in newspapers all over the world. 9 The
story even merited space in the pages of The New York Times,

5. Max contends that during the course of their two month relationship
he and Johnson engaged in sexual intercourse in the back of her truck,
engaged in intense sexual activity for days at a time, and were generally
engaged in a relationship that was "defined very much by sex." See Tucker
Max, The Miss Vermont Story, at http://www.tuckermax.com/Stories/
missvermont.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
6. ld.
7. Id.
8. See Order for Temporary Injunction at 1, Johnson (No.
2003CA004867AF) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
9. See, e.g., Terence Blacker, On Planet Blog, Everyone Can Be a
Celebrity, INDEPENDENT (London), June 10, 2003, at 11 (reporting how Katy
Johnson was "obliged to go to court to prevent a blogger called Tucker Max
[from] revealing distressing details of their relationshipS'); David Stonehouse,
Price of Glory, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 12, 2003, at 6 (reporting how
"[a] judge in Florida has gagged the now infamous online cad [Tucker Max]

and his website").
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where First Amendment experts reacted to the temporary
injunction issued against Max with shock, given that such "prior
restraints [on speech] based on invasion of privacy are unusual""'
and always "generate[] enormous controversy"" given the
protection afforded speech by the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
Katy Johnson voluntarily dismissed her suit, thereby
enabling Tucker Max to repost his account of the relationship on
his website.12 But the two-month legal battle between Johnson and
Max was more than just a blip on the legal radar. Johnson v. Max
serves as a perfect illustration of the "sphere of collision"' 3 within
which the rights of speech and privacy non-harmoniously co-exist.
This note will focus on this sphere of collision, specifically
addressing why conditioning the protection of true, publicized
private facts on a vague notion of "newsworthiness," as laid out in a
per se tortious invasion of privacy, is constitutionally unworkable.
Section II will trace the origins of the common law right to privacy
and explain the elements of a per se case of tortious publication of
private facts. Furthermore, Section II will introduce in greater
depth how the notion of a common law right to privacy creates
tension with a free speech regime.
Section III will show how the current understanding of this
privacy tort has led to logically inconsistent case law across the
country. In light of this conflicting case law, Section IV uses the
facts of Johnson v Max as applied to a hypothetical Johnson trial to
show the doctrinal infeasibility that stems from premising
constitutional protection of speech on an amorphous notion of
privacy and newsworthiness. Section V will address some pressing
concerns this regime of privacy rights creates, thereby concluding

10. Adam Liptak, Internet Battle Raises Questions About Privacy and the
First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at A13.
11. Id. (quoting New York University law professor Diane L.
Zimmerman).
12. See Woman Drops Suit Over Alleged Affair with Web Site Owner,

July 23, 2003, at 12 (reporting that Johnson "dropped her
lawsuit against [Max] who posted a story on his Web site alleging that the two
had an affair" and that Max's "original story was reposted on the Internet").
13. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
CHI. SUN-TIMES,
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that, consistent with a broad understanding of First Amendment
principles, privacy concerns can never trump the expressly granted
constitutional right to free speech.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE "SPHERE OF COLLISION"

A. Warren and Brandeis
While many take privacy rights as "a basic axiom of the
human condition,"'14 in a doctrinal sense the common law right to
privacy emerged just over one century ago." In The Right to
Privacy,16 Samuel D. Warren and future Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis first proposed the notion of an actionable tort claim
stemming from common law principles for invasion of privacy. 7
Warren and Brandeis argued that the idea of a common law right to
privacy was "forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and to-day [sic]
fitly tempered to [man's] hand."'"
The underlying motivations for Warren and Brandeis's
article may have had less to do with a desire to secure natural law
rights than a reaction to a privacy invasion experienced by one of
the authors. Warren personally experienced the propensity of the
14. WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE RIGHT TO KNOW; MEDIA AND THE
COMMON GOOD 145 (1973).
15. See ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL
LIABILITY 4 (2001) (noting that the first major treatise on First Amendment
law only dedicated one paragraph of its 566 pages to the subject of civil
liability for speech).
16. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
17. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Beiter, Minnesota's Right of Privacy Torts:
Expanding Common Law Beyond Its Reasonable, Constitutional Bounds in
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 177, 181 (1998)

(supporting premise that The Right to Privacy was "the most 'famous,'
'influential' law review article ever written.., that... 'did nothing less than
add a chapter to our law"'(quoting Wendell Nimmer, The Right of Publicity,
19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 203 (1954)); Wilbur Larremore, The Law of
Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 693 (1912) (arguing that Warren and
Brandeis's article "enjoys the unique distinction of having initiated and
theoretically outlined a new field of jurisprudence").
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 220.
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press to "intru[de] upon the domestic circle"' when, after hosting a
gathering at his house, the guest list to his party was printed in one
of the Boston dailies. 2 Thus, at least partially because of personal
experience, Warren and Brandeis established "a new principle on
which to erect a legal structure previously without existence. 2'
Warren and Brandeis concluded that the right to privacy
was "inevitable" because "[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth
which characterizes the common law enabled ... judges to afford
the requisite protection [for a right of privacy]. 22 They further
defined the right as a grant of decision-making power to the
individual to determine "to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions [were to] be communicated to others," and to "fix the
limits of the publicity which shall be given them. 23 So, while the
two jurists "certainly did not invent privacy nor discover it... they
[did make] explicit and logical the reason for its existence which
man had intuitively perceived from the start. 2 4 It is that logical
reasoning that has provided the structure upon which modern tort
actions for invasion of privacy are based.
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
Courts across the country quickly adopted and applied
Warren and Brandeis's legal theory. The first clear recognition of a
claim based on invasion of privacy came in Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co. 25 Since the formal recognition of this
common law right in Pavesich, most states have come to permit a

19. Id. at 196.
20. See ONEIL, supra note 15, at 76.
21. MARNELL, supra note 14, at 152.
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 195.
23. Id. at 198.
24. MARNELL, supra note 14, at 146.
25. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). "The right of privacy within certain limits is a
right derived from natural law.., and guaranteed to persons in [Georgia] by
the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia .
I..."
Id. at
71.
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recovery of damages for invasion of privacy.' In the 115 years since
the publication of Warren and Brandeis's article, the common law
protection of privacy has emerged as a right "plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society,"27 that is "so
native to human nature that its reason for being is implicit in the
very fact of the human state itself. ' 2 The doctrine has become so

ingrained that The Restatement of the Law Second-Torts has
devoted an entire section to the publication of private facts."
In order to be subject to liability under the private facts tort,
a defendant must: (1) give publicity; ' (2) to a matter concerning
the private life of the plaintiff;" (3) in such a way that would be

26. See O'NEIL, supra note 15, at 77 (indicating that in 1998 Minnesota
allowed recovery of damages for some types of privacy invasions, leaving
North Dakota and Wyoming as the only states whose courts do not recognize
an invasion of privacy action).

27. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
28. See MARNELL, supra note 14, at 145.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977). While The Right to
Privacy was concerned primarily with the publicity given to private facts, the
Restatement's treatment of the tortious invasion of privacy also addresses
three additional tort actions for the invasion of privacy. Under the
Restatement, the four privacy torts are: unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, § 652B; appropriation of the other's name or likeness,
§ 652C; unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, § 652D; and
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public,
§ 652E. Although seemingly more thorough, some commentators argue that
the Restatement's treatment of the notion of a right to privacy has replaced a
"grand underlying principle of inviolate personality and individual dignity ...
[with] four ad hoc categories... [and effectively cut] the tort loose from the
philosophic moorings Warren and Brandeis gave it ....
Harry Kalven Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 333 (1966). Additionally, most commentary on civil
liability for speech focuses on section 652D of the Restatement (publicity
given to private facts) since other privacy torts, for various reasons, are largely
inconsequential in terms of the ongoing debate between speech and privacy
rights. See id. (arguing that the other three privacy torts are, respectively,
logical and not worth debating, hardly used, or basically covered by
defamation law). As such, the focus of this note is on the type of tortious
invasion of privacy that Warren and Brandeis addressed and that is covered by
§ 652D: publicity of a truthful matter concerning the private life of another.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 39-46.
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highly offensive to a reasonable person;32 and (4) of facts that are
not of legitimate concern to the public," that is facts that are not
newsworthy. 4 The publicity element of the tort is perhaps the least
troublesome since it can, with some ease, be quantified.
"Publicity" 35 in the tortious sense occurs when a fact is
communicated to the public at large or to so many persons that the
matter will almost certainly become public knowledge.' Unlike the
reasonableness and newsworthiness elements of the tort, the
publicity determination is a matter of numbers. There is no "magic
formula or 'body count' 37 that serves as a threshold for
determining the publicity of the disclosure, but since most cases of
public disclosure of private facts deal with the mass media, or in the
current age, distribution over a sweeping medium like the Internet,
determining publicity is rarely the source of contention.38
The second element of the private facts tort, the
requirement that publicized facts must be about the complainant's
private life,3 9 ensures that liability does not attach for publicity
given to facts that were already public.' ° Whether a person is a
32. See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
34. See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 91 (1990) [hereinafter Privacy]
(noting also that some courts require the absence of any waiver of privilege by
the plaintiff as a fourth element to a "cause of action for invasion of privacy
based on the public disclosure of private facts").
35. "Publicity" differs from "publication" in that publication entails any
communication of a fact to a third person, whereas publicity requires the
communication of a fact to the public at large. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
36. Id.
37. Privacy, supra note 34, § 95.

38. By definition, a fact has been given "publicity," as that term is known
to the law, when "it is made public, by communicating it to the public at large,
or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
certain to become one of public knowledge."

RESTATEMENT §

652D cmt. a.

Thus, when something is published on the Internet, such a "substantially
certain" standard is sure to be met.
39. See id. § 652D cmt. b (stating that, generally speaking, sexual
relations, family quarrels, illnesses, and intimate personal letters are
considered private facts.).
40. Id. Date of birth, fact of marriage, military record, and record of
admittance to a profession are other examples of things universally held to be
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voluntary4 ' or involuntary4 2 public figure has some bearing on this
determination as the distinction will, to some extent, define what
aspects of a complainant's life are "private." Generally, though,
those who have been placed in the public light, voluntarily or
involuntarily, have a considerably lesser degree of privacy interest
such that matters that would be considered private for someone not
in the public spotlight are not so considered in their cases."
The "private life" element discussed here should not be
confused with the "newsworthiness" element,44 which evaluates
is given to private facts that are of
instances in which publicity
45
relevant public concern. While the "private life" element seems
identical to the newsworthiness element, the two are distinct and
serve different
purposes in determining a per se case of tortious
4
conduct. 46

The "publicity" and "private life" elements establish the
base line for an invasion of privacy claim. Once it is established
that publicity has been given to private facts, a plaintiff must then
show that the facts were publicized in such a way that would be
offensive to the reasonable person and that the facts were not
newsworthy.
A finder of fact must make a reasonableness

public facts, as are facts that a complainant, himself, leaves open to the public.
See id.
41. See id. § 652D cmt. e (stating that a voluntary public figure is one who
willingly engaged in public activities or assumes a role in matters having a
public interest.)
42. See id. § 652D cmt. f (stating that individuals become involuntary
public figures when they have neither sought, nor consented to, publicity, but
nevertheless have become a source of public interest).
43. See id. It seems to follow that if victims have a lesser privacy interest
because of what involuntarily happened to them, then those who, by virtue of
their own actions are drawn into the public eye, would have a considerably
lesser privacy interest.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
45. See RESTATEMENT § 652D cmt. d.
46. The distinction here is admittedly nuanced but really turns on
concepts of necessity and sufficiency. In order to trigger a cause of action
under the private facts tort it is necessary that the publicity given to a fact
about a complainant's life be private. If the fact is public then no cause for
finding liability exists. That a fact is private is not sufficient to find liability
though, for if the fact is found to be newsworthy, no liability can be found.

2004]
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determination, keeping in mind the reality that no one in this world
can expect to live in complete privacy, unless he or she is a hermit
in the desert.47 For example, publicity given to casual observations
by one's neighbors is thought to be a reasonable expectation of
living in an open society. 4' Generally a "minor [or] moderate
annoyance ',49 stemming from an invasion of privacy is considered
tolerable in the eyes of the common law. In contrast, an invasion of
privacy that causes one to feel "seriously aggrieved by [the
disclosure]", 50 would reach a level of offensiveness sufficient to
trigger the tort.
Of most concern to any private facts tort analysis is the
public concern, or "newsworthiness,' ', element since this is the
critical element of the tort, on which liability usually hinges. The
burden of proving newsworthiness, or more specifically the lack
thereof, lies with the plaintiff so, at least in theory, there
is52not a
•
"chilling effect on [the defendant's] freedom of expression." The
newsworthiness element serves as a filter, allowing speech that
constitutes "news" and proscribing speech that is "no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." '
Although the notion of newsworthiness centers around a vague
4
notion of the customs and conventions of the community, fact,

47. See id. § 652D cmt. c.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Differing courts and jurisdictions use the terms "facts of public
concern" and "newsworthy" interchangeably.
52. Diaz v. Oakland Trib., Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 770 (1983) (holding
that "to place the burden of proving newsworthiness on the defendants in
order to defend against the action would have a chilling effect on their
freedom of expression"). But see infra text accompanying notes 127-31; cf.
Privacy, supra note 34, § 186 (stating that in all cases a "defendant should be
prepared to make a showing that the disclosure complained of was a matter in
which the public had a legitimate interest").
53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).

54. See RESTATEMENT § 652D cmt. g. The newsworthiness standard
described here is analogous to the test adopted by the Court in Miller v.
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finders also utilize a three-part test to objectively determine
newsworthiness based on: "(1) the social value of the facts
published, (2) the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private
affairs, and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to
a position of public notoriety."' 5 Yet, whether relying on a threepart test or on the reasonableness determination of a jury, in
practice the use of a newsworthiness standard in invasion of privacy
cases has created a muddled jurisprudence in this area of the law.
C. Entering the "Sphere"
In a societal vacuum, the notion of protecting privacy with a
tort action seems both logical and comforting. However, this vision
of privacy must be reconciled with the almost unfettered protection
afforded to speech in our society of civil liberties.i Truly, "[o]ur
First Amendment is by far the oldest and most durable of the
world's guarantees of free expression. ,5 The right to free speech
and expression "is an essential process for advancing knowledge

California,413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In that opinion, the Court held that the test
for discerning whether pornographic material was "obscene" would be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). As with the use of a community standards criterion in
obscenity jurisprudence under the Miller test, determining newsworthiness
based on the customs and conventions of the community can be problematic
since any publicity given to a private fact "will be judged by the standards of
the community most likely to be offended by the message." Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S.844, 878 (1997).
55. Privacy, supra note 34, § 187; see also Privacy, supra note 34, § 187
cmt. (noting that the first prong of the test plays the most crucial role in
determining newsworthiness).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press").
57. O'NEIL, supra note 15, at 4.
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and discovering truth,"' 5 and provides for "participation in decision
making by all members of society. " The protection afforded to
speech under our Constitution is "a means of achieving a more
acceptable and hence a more stable community... [that is] key to
democracy and self-government." 60 As such, courts guard the right
to free speech with passion and purpose, especially given that
"those who won our independence believed.., that without free
speech.., discussion would be futile; that with [it], discussion
affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of
1

noxious doctrine."'
In fact, as a result63 of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'2

line of defamation cases and the decisions in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn and its progeny, a large chunk of the metaphorical
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
62. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
63. See generally Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30-32
(1971) (extending Sullivan protections to defamatory falsehoods relating to
private figures if the matter at issue was of public concern); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65 (1967) (extending the Sullivan rule to all
public figures); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (prohibiting public officials from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
absent proof of actual malice on the part of the speaker). But see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states may
constitutionally proscribe defamatory falsehoods of private individuals not
relating to matters of public concern).
64. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (holding that the right to publish publicly
available court records "appears to ... be of critical importance to our type of
government").
65. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that
publicizing truthful, newsworthy information lawfully obtained from a source
who obtained it unlawfully is protected by the First Amendment from
liability); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that
publicizing truthful information obtained lawfully from police prepared report
cannot be subject to tort liability absent a state interest of the highest order);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding that newspapers
publicizing truthful information obtained through lawful monitoring of police
channels and through interviews with witnesses are immune from liability,
absent a State interest of the highest order).
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publicized speech pie has been affirmatively granted protection
under the First Amendment, irrespective of privacy concerns. It is
no exaggeration to say that incrementally, the Supreme Court has
extended protection to most publicized speech that implicates
is true or false. 6
privacy concerns, regardless of whether the speech
Thus, it would seem to logically follow that if the First Amendment
protects most false statements against another person, the
Constitution would be even more vigilant in its protection of similar
true statements.
Generally, courts are very reluctant to infringe on the
notion of a robust protection of speech in order to protect a broad,
common law notion of privacy rights.67 To date however, the
Supreme Court has rejected an absolutist approach, consistently
refusing "to answer categorically whether truthful publication may
As a
ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment. '"
private
truthful,
result, the remaining slice of pie-publicized
information-has not been granted a presumption of constitutional
protection under the First Amendment. Instead, the constitutional
protection of speech that gives publicity to private facts is
conditioned upon a vague standard of "newsworthiness." Thus,
speech in this vein is theoretically subject to civil liability under the
tort theory described above and, as with other areas of speech
whose protection is subject to undefined legal standards, 69 has
become vulnerable to problems regarding adequate notice of
wrongdoing and the potential chill on protected speech. Nothing is
more illustrative of this phenomenon than a brief analysis of the
inconsistent case law in this area of constitutional doctrine.

66. See supra notes 62-65.
67. As will be shown, while there have been court-imposed prior
restraints on speech in the name of privacy, "given the potentially chilling
effect on free expression, courts have been extremely reluctant to grant
recovery in damages for the accurate reporting even of highly personal and
embarrassing information." O'NEIL, supra note 15, at 77.
68. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
69. The most notable area in which this is a problem is the Court's
treatment of obscenity. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court failed to "formulate
a standard that sharply distinguishes protected from unprotected speech").
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Even given the guiding factors enumerated by the
Restatement,711 the idea of newsworthiness is so conceptually vague
that it offers little guidance to judges and juries who must
determine whether publicized facts should be afforded
constitutional protection.7 ' Determining constitutional protection
based on a vague standard of newsworthiness is perhaps the most
ringing indictment of the private facts tort. While many areas of
tort law are equally (if not more) vague because of similar
subjective standards, such "[a]mbiguous standards in a tort that
infringes upon first amendment interests... [are] inherently
suspect."72 There is no clearer evidence of this contention than the
conflicting, and fairly recent, decisions handed down by trial and
appellate courts across the country, including the Supreme Court,
whose subjective determinations of what constitutes a newsworthy
fact have been anything but consistent.
In M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc.73 the California Court of
Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the use of a Little
League team photo in a magazine article and a television program74
about a child molestation case was newsworthy and affirmed a
lower court decision allowing plaintiffs' private facts claim.' In its
opinion, the court gave little weight to the fact that the television
program's use of the team photo was "fleeting",16 and the magazine
failed to name any of the people pictured in the team photo with
the exception of the convicted child molester.7 The court also
rejected the defendant's claims that the use of the picture was

70. See supra text accompanying note 55.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26.
72. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291,302 (1983).
73. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (2001).
74. The magazine article was published in a September 1999 edition of
Sports Illustrated entitled "Every Parent's Nightmare." See id. at 507. The
television program was an HBO production entitled Real Sports. Id. at 506.
75. Id. at 515.
76. Id. at 507.
77. Id.
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newsworthy because it "show[ed] visually
that any child who plays
'
_71
way.
harm's
in
placed
be
can
sports
Instead, the California court held that "the record
support[ed] [the] plaintiffs' contention that their membership on
Watson's Little League team was a private fact first publicly
disclosed by Time Warner., 79 Since the team photograph was never
widely circulated and since none of the photographed team
members had been identified in previous media coverage, the
publicity given to the photo was not found to be newsworthy."0
Similarly, in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. 1 a California
court upheld a jury decision that the publicity given to plaintiff's
transsexuality was not newsworthy.
After becoming the first
female elected as student body president and student representative
of her community college, the Oakland Tribune published a story"
revealing plaintiff's birth as a male and subsequent sex change
operation.]' The court rejected the contention by the defendants
that as the first female student body president the plaintiff's sexual
identity was newsworthy as a matter of law."
However, other state courts, when faced with similar facts,
have reached diametrically opposite conclusions as to what
constitutes a newsworthy fact. In Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes,"8 the
78. Id. at 514.
79. Id. at 512.
80. Id.
81. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
82. Id. at 720. At trial, the judge incorrectly placed the burden of
determining newsworthiness on the defendants, but that was of no
consequence in the ultimate determination of the appellate court in upholding
the jury's verdict. See id.
83. Id. at 766. The story appeared in one of the paper's regular columns
and read: "The students at the College of Alameda will be surprised to learn
that student body president, Toni Diaz, is no lady, but is in fact a man whose
real name is Antonio." Id. The story was published after confidential sources
had alerted the paper of the story and the story was confirmed by a police
record of Diaz who previously had been arrested for solicitation while still a
male. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 773 (holding that the fact of plaintiff's transsexuality did not
"adversely reflect on her honesty or judgment").
86. Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2001).
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Texas Court of Appeals found that the local airing of videotapes
secretly made by a high school band teacher of female students in a
locker-room" was newsworthy. The videotapes included footage
of some of the female students changing clothes, although their
images were distorted and their names and identities were not
disclosed at any time. 8 The appeals court rejected the appellant's
claim that "being photographed in a private place is not a matter of
public concern,"' instead sustaining a jury's finding that the tapes
were newsworthy since they involved "crimes where kids [were]
exploited." 91
Similar to the decision in Mobile Video Tapes, a California
district court, in the case of Michaels v. Internet Entertainment
Group, Inc.,92 broadly construed the notion of newsworthiness to
encompass "not only matters of public policy, but any matter of
public concern, including the accomplishments, everyday lives, and
romantic involvements of famous people." 93 Given that definition,
the court rejected as a matter of law the claim that the publicity
given to a homemade tape9 depicting plaintiffs Pamela Anderson
and 1980s rocker Bret Michaels of Poison 95 fame engaged in sexual
intercourse was not newsworthy, thus not subject to liability under
the private facts tort. 96 Applying the three part test enumerated

87. Id. The teacher claimed he made the videotapes in order to ascertain
the identity of a person who had been going through students' things and
stealing from them. See id. at 46.
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (1998).
93. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
94. The tabloid television program Hard Copy obtained the tape and
broadcast short segments of the tape. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS
MEDIA LAW 433 (6th ed. 2000).
95. Poison was, arguably, one of the greatest musical groups of the "hair
band" genre, boasting such hits as Unskinny Bop, Something to Believe In, and
the timeless love ballad Every Rose has its Thorn. See generally Behind the
Music: Poison (VHI television broadcast, 1997-2003); 1 Love the 80s: 1986
(VH1 television broadcast, 2002).
96. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
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above to determine newsworthiness, 97 the court found that since
Anderson's fame was based on her position as a sex symbol, "the
private matters broadcast bore a substantial nexus to a matter of
public interest which was not outweighed by their depth of
intrusiveness.""
Given the above examples, it is clear that no static,
constitutionally sufficient standard could ever be gleaned from a
newsworthiness test based on community mores. The examples
above show that cases in this area of law are not easily reconciled
with one another. For example, based on the facts, M.G. v. Time
Warner and Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes seem to be
indistinguishable cases that would yield similar outcomes. Yet,
where the court in M.G. held that the use of a picture of children
who had been abused was not newsworthy because of
countervailing privacy concerns," in Doe the court held as
newsworthy a videotape of children being abused despite privacy
100
concerns.
Moreover, this conflicting case law can only be reconciled
with existing Supreme Court precedent through substantial mental
gymnastics. The decision in M.G. seems to fly directly in the face of
the Supreme Court's seminal holdings in Cox Broadcasting v.
Cohn'l ' and Florida Star v. B.J.F.12 Given the Court's holding in
each case that the publication of the identity of rape and murder
victims, respectively, were held to be protected speech, one might
imagine that the lesser disclosure of a group photo that "did not
name any of the people [pictured] except [the convicted child
molester] " 103 would similarly be protected. 104

97. See supra text accompanying note 55.
98. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.

99. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504,515 (2001).
100. Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40,59 (Tex. App. 2001).
101. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
102. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).

103. M.G., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507.
104. Admittedly, the distinction between the three cases probably turned

more on whether the facts publicized were private than public, however, the
comparison is still relevant in examining the lack of consistency in the
determination of newsworthiness in private facts cases.
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The decision in Diaz also appears to run afoul of the notion
of protecting newsworthy speech. Much of the reason Diaz's run
for student body president was considered newsworthy and duly
reported by the local media was because Diaz was the first woman
elected to that post.115 Considering that her gender was the reason
behind some, if not a majority, of the media attention given to her
election, it is hard to argue that the revelation of her genderchanging surgery was not equally as newsworthy. Further, although
the court held the "public arena entered by Diaz [was] concededly
small,"1 ' she certainly did not shy away from publicity as she
"became embroiled in a controversy in which she charged the
College administrators with misuse of student funds." ' 7 Regardless
of the size of the student body, Diaz should have been subject to a
reduced
expectation of privacy given her public capacity and
...
101
visibility. Although the court felt that "the fact that [Diaz was] a
transsexual [did] not adversely reflect on her honesty or
judgment,' taking such determinations away from the general
public, and in this case voters, by suppressing speech controverts
the most basic and cherished First Amendment principles.
IV. JOHNSON V. MAX

Given the existing state of the newsworthiness doctrine as
discussed, it is unresolved as to how the Johnson v. Max case might
have come out were it taken to trial. Most likely, Max would have
focused his case on Johnson's celebrity status.10 Johnson's place in
105. Diaz v. Oakland Trib. Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 765 ("In spring 1977,
[Diaz] was elected student body president for the 1977-1978 academic year,
the first woman to hold that office. Her election and an unsuccessful attempt
to unseat her were reported in the College newspaper, the Reporter .. ");
see
also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1973) (holding that "[a]
candidate who, for example, seeks to further his cause through the prominent
display of his wife and children can hardly argue that his qualities as a husband
or father remain of 'purely private' concern").
106. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
107. Id. at 766.
108. See supra notes 41-43.
109. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
110. See supra note 41 and text accompanying notes 92-98.
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the public eye makes any news about her, disparaging or not, more
likely to qualify as newsworthy; thus denying her right to recover
under a tort action involving the right to privacy. Further, since
Johnson holds herself out to the public as a spokeswoman for moral
and virtuous conduct among young girls,'' Max's newsworthiness
argument under the three-pronged test would be even stronger. If
Johnson is purporting to be a role model for American teenage
girls, a court may find private conduct counter to her espoused
values newsworthy.
In support of her position, Johnson need not look any
further than the origins of the right to privacy and Brandeis and
Warren's seminal law review article. 2 Speech that does little more
than "satisfy a prurient taste" by "detail[ing] sexual relations" was
exactly the type of speech that the two legal scholars wanted a right
of privacy to protect against."' The Restatement Commentary also
supports this point, as most of the examples provided in the
Commentary seem to presume a nearly unfettered right to privacy
when sexual issues are involved" 4
Johnson could also use recent case law to her advantage, by
trying to persuade the court to take a line of reasoning similar to
that of M.G. v. Time Warner.l5 Since her sex life had never been
publicized prior to her relationship with
Max, she could argue that
116
it was not a matter of public concern.
The fact that Johnson is
famous for her virtuous and moral lifestyle may give greater
credence to this claim. "'
Virgil v. Time reinforces Johnson's

111. See e.g., What's Hot What's Not, at http://www.katyjohnson.com/
hot.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (showing cartoon of a male and female
hand-in-hand with the caption: "What's hot: A guy who respects sex; What's
not: A guy who expects sex.) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review).
112. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16.
113. Id. at 196.

114. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 652D cmt. b (1977)

("Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private matters.").
115. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
Unlike Pamela
Anderson, whose fame was based on her status as a sex symbol, Katy
Johnson's fame was based on her self-professed, morally upstanding lifestyle.
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position, stating that while the public's interest in knowing some
"private" information will sometimes trump an asserted right to
privacy; the "public's right to know is... subject to reasonable
limitations."' "
These hypothetical arguments for Johnson v. Max are
instructive in that they again illustrate the law's failure to provide
sufficient guidelines for balancing privacy rights with speech rights.
Due to the inherent uncertainty surrounding the newsworthiness
standard, as detailed above, there is no way for Tucker Max, or any
other citizen, to predict with any reasonable degree of certainty
whether his or her speech will be granted constitutional protection
or be subject to civil liability. As a result, trial court judges are
emboldened to issue prior restraints on speech that, while
temporary, are still inimical to the fundamental guarantees of
liberty offered by the First Amendment.' 9
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

The newsworthiness element of the private facts tort, which
was intended to maintain the balance between privacy and speech
rights, has, in many cases, done the exact opposite. In practice, the
subjective determination of newsworthiness has proven inconsistent
and troublesome to free speech."
Adherence to a standard of
newsworthiness based on community mores leads to problems of
constitutional vagueness, selective liability, and unnecessary self2
censorship threatening a chill on speech.1
122' As Justice Douglas held
in his dissent in Roth v. United States, "Any test that turns on
118. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (1975).
119. See e.g., Temporary Injunction at 1, Johnson v. Max, No.
2003CA004867AF (Fla. Cir. C1. Palm Beach County) (on file with the First

Amendment Law Review); Liptak, supra note 10, at A13 (reporting that one
professor of Internet law referred to the temporary injunction issued in the
Max case as "kooky").
120. See supra text accompanying note 54.
121. See e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86-93 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing how these problems exist in the realm of
obscenity under a community standard similar to the "newsworthiness"
element of the private facts tort).
122. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too
capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared
with the First Amendment.', 23 Similarly with the private facts tort,
it is virtually impossible under the vague newsworthiness standard
to determine what type of speech will be afforded constitutional
protection and what type will be subject to liability.
While most courts recognize that "[t]he definition of the
'line to be drawn' is not as clear as one would wish,"'124 instead of
creating a formal rule, they rely on trial mechanisms like summary
judgment and directed verdict to correct instances where a jury
application of the vague newsworthiness standard would yield a
As a result, judicial decisions in
prior restraint on free speech.
privacy and speech cases "vary within and across jurisdictions and
particular judge or jury
depend primarily on the intuition of the
26
who controls the outcome of the case.'
Under the current privacy regime, 27 speakers are left simply
to guess whether speech will be subject to liability for tortious
invasion of privacy. Due to the lack of a coherent standard, "the
right to publish [will] suffer at the hands of a jury which ...[will]
be more likely to use a general verdict [of liability] in order to
The "considerable
punish unpopular speech and persons.', 28
'
29
given to speakers by the First Amendment suffers
deference'
severely, "invit[ing] timidity and self-censorship and very likely
lead[ing] to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be
published [or spoken] and that should be made available to the
public."' 3" Thus, speech that may lie well within the margins of
newsworthiness may be silenced in order to avoid the potential of
123. Id. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1975).

125. Diaz v. Oakland Trib., Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983) (rejecting
defendant's argument that leaving the determination of constitutional speech
protection in the hands of a jury under such a vague standard of
newsworthiness is problematic).
126. Joseph Elford, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of
Rights" Approach to the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L. J. 727,727 (1995).
127. See supra Sections II.B-III.

128. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
129. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504,513 (2001).
130. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
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liabiity.'3

Additionally, the fact that standards of what is newsworthy
vary depending on geographic and cultural contexts illuminates
further the constitutionally problematic
nature of the
newsworthiness standard.
Applying community standards to
speech that transcends community mores, as most all publicized
speech will, subjects speech to the interpretations of the most
puritanical communities in the nation as to what is news.'33 Unlike
other speech regulated by a community-based standard that can be
selectively distributed, the publicity given to private facts is often
done via the mass media or, in more recent years, on the Internet.'
Thus, while a distributor of pornography may avoid potential
criminal obscenity prosecution by selectively mailing his products
only to certain areas of the country, 136 those who speak over a
broader medium, like cable television and the Internet, cannot
similarly channel their speech.'37

131. Zimmerman, supra note 72, at 305.
132. In order to have a cause of action under the private facts tort, the
matter must be publicized to the public at large in such a manner that it will
become public-knowledge. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38. In the
modern age, as in Max v. Johnson, such publicity is promulgated on the
Internet, a medium that knows no boundaries, thereby transcending
community mores.
133. See supra note 54.

134. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
804 (2000) (explaining how pornographic television channels can be "blocked"
thereby preventing their entry into the home); Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (discussing "technological approach[es]
to restricting dial-a-porn messages [only] to adults who seek them").
135. Johnson v. Max provides an apt example. The story about Katy
Johnson on Max's website was accessible by anyone in the United States, or
the world, with access to the Internet. See Max, supra note 5.
136. In theory, a speaker distributing his message via the mails might
avoid potential criminal or civil liability for his speech under a standard based
on community mores by simply refusing to distribute in parts of the country
where community standards are less liberal. This self-monitoring device is not
available for those distributing their message over the Internet or through
mass media.
137. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997) (explaining that which is
posted on the internet is "available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo
and Prague").
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Even assuming a concrete, recognizable standard of
newsworthiness could be set, the very idea of defining "news"
presents a problem on its face.
Assuming, arguendo, that
newsworthiness is defined by the news media-that is to say that
what is newsworthy is entirely a function of what is presented to us
as news-the tort crumbles under its own weight.'
Since, "[i]n
general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is
best covered,"' 3 9 it seems reasonable to take the determination of
what is newsworthy outside the province of the courts. Instead, the
newsworthiness decision should be left to the media, internal
journalistic standards of ethics, and, ultimately, the marketplace
espoused by Brandeis and Holmes.
Just as Justice Stevens was
"not prepared to rely on either the average citizen's
understanding... or on [his] fellow judges' appraisal of what
[constituted obscenity],"' 4 ' it is doubtful that many Americans are
ready to rely on similar understandings in making the
determination of what the general populace should be privy to as
"newsworthy" and what should be kept from them under the guise
of an amorphous right of privacy. In truth, the Supreme Court does
not merit the distinction of sitting as a "Supreme Board of
[Editors].' 42
In establishing a presumption that any true statement giving
publicity to private facts is, by definition, newsworthy and, as such,
143
immune from liability, the definition of newsworthiness will no
longer be unknown "until at least five members of [the] Court,
'
applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it So. 144
Instead, the media will be bound by the ethical constraints of its
138. See Kalven, supra note 29, at 336.
139. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 513 (2001).
140. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
141. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 319 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
142. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684,
690 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
143. See Kalven, supra note 29, at 336.

144. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the effective test for obscenity under a vague standard
similar to that used to define newsworthiness).
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own profession and by the demands of the public to publicize news
of public concern rather than meaningless "gossip'1'4 and "details of
sexual relations. 1 46 However, just as "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric,"'4 7 one man's needless gossip may well be another's
headline news. Thus, the public may demand, and the media may
publicize, private facts that do fall on the margins of a mainstream
notion of newsworthiness.
Either way, if the ideals of the
marketplace hold true then publicity given to non-newsworthy facts
will be subject to a "failure of energy [that] stifles the movement at
its birth.' 48
Finally, in making the determination of supremacy between
privacy and speech rights, it is instructive to look at Warren and
Brandeis' motivations for advancing such an innovative area of
common law more than a century ago ago. In light of the personal
element underlying the creation of the right to privacy, 14 perhaps a
second look at the common law revolution that undermined the
constitutional guarantee to free speech is justified. It certainly
seems troublesome to limit the vehicle by which we come to
knowledge and truth for any reason, even the prevention and
avoidance of social embarrassment.
When one takes into
consideration the damage done to the constitutionally guaranteed
right to free speech as a result of the evolution of privacy rights, it
seems warranted to re-evaluate the true justifications behind a
common law right to privacy.
Ironically, there was no bigger proponent of that belief than
the co-author of The Right to Privacy, Louis D. Brandeis. Along
with fellow Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice Brandeis was
one of the staunchest proponents of broad speech protection.
Writing in Whitney v. California,50 Brandeis argued that in order to
suppress speech under any circumstances, "there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech
145. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 196.
146. Id.
147. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).

148. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
dissenting).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
150. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

(Holmes, J.,
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is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
one."''5
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
Despite Brandeis's published152 hatred for privacy invasions, his
liberal framing of speech rights makes it hard to imagine Brandeis
approving of the common law right to privacy trumping free
speech.
While recognizing that privacy is "a great and important
53
we cannot overlook that "tort law's effort to protect the
value,'
right of privacy seems to [be] a mistake.' ' 54 It is far from sacrilege
to "wonder if the [private facts] tort is not an anachronism, a
nineteenth century response to the mass press which is hardly in
keeping with the more robust tastes or mores of today.""15' The
most superficial scan of contemporary evening television
programming or weekly periodicals reveals the same type of tabloid
journalism in the current American press that catalyzed Warren
and Brandeis to propose the common law right to privacy over a
century ago.
This is not to imply our current standards are more prurient.
To the contrary, it shows we live in an age where disclosure and
public discourse flow exponentially more freely. As a society, our
conceptions of what constitutes newsworthiness are constantly
evolving due, in part, to the rapid evolution of technology.

151. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
152. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16.
153. See Kalven, supra note 29, at 327.
154. Id.
155. id. at 329.
156. The influx of celebrity "news" programs is so pronounced that a
"summary of 4000 stories in both print and broadcast media over 1977 to
1997 ... revealed that celebrity gossip stories had expanded from 15 percent to
43 percent of the total." Jonathan W. Lubell, The Constitutional Challenge to
Democracy and the First Amendment Posed By the Present Structure and
Operation of the Media Industry Under the Telecommunications Acts, 17 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 11, 13 n.3 (2003). Television programs like inside
Edition and Entertainment Tonight are devoted almost entirely to the
coverage of celebrity lives, both personal and private. People magazine, the
print equivalent of such television programs, similarly covers the private
aspects of celebrity lives.
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Whatever subjective value judgments might be placed on that
evolving standard is immaterial.
What is important is that information is presented to the
marketplace for acceptance or denial by the people, not subjected
to civil liability in a courtroom. Although the publication of a
dinner party guest list in a daily newspaper might have created an
actionable claim for invasion of privacy in 1890, today far more
intrusive information is considered to be newsworthy. Given
modern conceptions of "newsworthiness," publication of a list of
dinner guests may be of minimal concern for public and private
figures alike,"' making it hard to find Warren and Brandeis'
argument, in its proper context, to be persuasive as against the
freedom of speech."'
VI. CONCLUSION

Once "private facts" become known, they are, by definition,
no longer "private" and cannot be kept from public dissemination
by way of judicial intervention. Admittedly, abandoning the right
to privacy as against the right to free speech may well have some of
the very same chilling effects on speech as discussed above. Instead
of fearing liability for speech, speakers could potentially censor
themselves for fear of having each and every word publicized
against their will. Yet, the inconsistencies in the case law created by
the current balancing regime should be reexamined. Recognizing
that no system will be perfect, there must be faith placed in the selfrestraint of the media, the promotion of ethical guidelines, and the
overarching demands of the marketplace.
Brandeis and Warren's fears of the most intimate facts

157. See e.g., Names & Faces: A Hilton With Southern Exposure, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at D3 (reporting on the release of a sex tape featuring
billionaire heiress Paris Hilton).
158. But see Donald R. Simon, Big Media: Its Effect on the Marketplace
of Ideas and How To Slow the Urge To Merge, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER

& INFO. L. 247, 271 (2002) (arguing that the media's allowance of a "barrage
of mindless celebrity 'news' " allows the media to filter out other salient news
stories, thereby undermining the marketplace of ideas).
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being revealed on "the house-tops ' ' 51 may in fact come true.
that is the case, the marketplace of ideas should be
censorship takes place, in the form of a wide-ranging and
rejection of such speech, not in the tribunals of this nation
subjective behest of judges and jurors.

159. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 195.

But if
where
robust
at the

